Lattice signature schemes generally require particular care when it comes to preventing secret information from leaking through signature transcript. For example, the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) signature scheme and the NTRUSign scheme were completely broken by the parallelepiped-learning attack of Nguyen and Regev (Eurocrypt 2006). Several heuristic countermeasures were also shown vulnerable to similar statistical attacks. At PKC 2008, Plantard, Susilo and Win proposed a new variant of GGH, informally arguing resistance to such attacks. Based on this variant, Plantard, Sipasseuth, Dumondelle and Susilo proposed a concrete signature scheme, called DRS, that is in the round 1 of the NIST post-quantum cryptography project. In this work, we propose yet another statistical attack and demonstrate a weakness of the DRS scheme: one can recover some partial information of the secret key from sufficiently many signatures. One difficulty is that, due to the DRS reduction algorithm, the relation between the statistical leak and the secret seems more intricate. We work around this difficulty by training a statistical model, using a few features that we designed according to a simple heuristic analysis. While we only recover partial secret coefficients, this information is easily exploited by lattice attacks, significantly decreasing their complexity. Concretely, we claim that, provided that 100 000 signatures are available, the secret key may be recovered using BKZ-138 for the first set of DRS parameters submitted to the NIST. This puts the security level of this parameter set below 80-bits (maybe even 70-bits), to be compared to an original claim of 128-bits. Furthermore, we review the DRS v2 scheme that is proposed to resist above statistical attack. For this countermeasure, while one may not recover partial secret coefficients exactly by learning, it seems feasible to gain some information on the secret key. Exploiting this information, we can still effectively reduce the cost of lattice attacks. This is an extended version of the conference paper [36] . New material has been added as Section 6, treating the application of our technique to the second version of DRS [30, 33] .
1 Introduction large coefficients of the secret matrix S and to determine most of their signs as well. Finally, we can feed this leaked information back into lattice attacks (BDD-uSVP attack), significantly decreasing their cost. Concretely, we claim that the first set of parameters offers at most 80-bits of security, significantly less than the original claim of 128-bits.
As a by-product, we formalize how to accelerate BDD attack when given some known coefficients of the solution. More specifically, we are able to construct a lattice of the same volume but smaller dimension for this kind of BDD instances.
To resist the above attack, Sipasseuth, Plantard and Susilo proposed the DRS v2 scheme [30, 33] as a countermeasure. In this paper, we also analyze DRS v2. Indeed this scheme has a better resistance to the aforementioned attack: we cannot determine partial secret coefficients by learning directly. Nevertheless it seems still feasible to make a guess carrying secret information using learning technique. Provided sufficiently many samples are available, the guess can be effectively exploited by lattice attacks. As a consequence, we claim that the parameter set for at least 128-bits of security actually provides the security of at most 100-bits once 2 30 transcripts are released.
Our scripts are open source for checking, reproduction or extension purposes, available at https://github.com/yuyang-Tsinghua/DRS_Cryptanalysis. Related work. In 2018, Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan proposed a chosen message attack [20] against the randomized version of Plantard-Susilo-Win GGH signature variant [31] . Their starting observation is that the difference between two signatures of a same message is a relatively short lattice vector in the randomized Plantard-Susilo-Win scheme, then from enough such short lattice vectors one may recover some short vectors of the secret matrix by lattice reduction. The randomized modification is a crucial weakness of Plantard-Susilo-Win scheme exploited by the attack in [20] . To fix such weakness, the authors mentioned two strategies: storing previous messages and padding a random nonce in the hash function. In comparison, our targeted scheme and technical idea are different from those in [20] . More importantly, the weakness of the DRS scheme that we demonstrate does not seem to be easily fixed.
Roadmap. In Section 2, we introduce notations and background on lattices. In Section 3, we provide a brief description of DRS signature scheme. Then we explain how to learn large coefficients of the secret matrix in Section 4, and how to combine partial information and lattice techniques to recover the full key in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide a cryptanalysis of the DRS v2 scheme. Finally, we conclude and discuss potential countermeasure in Section 7.
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Preliminaries
We use bold lowercase letters for vectors and denote by v i the i-th entry of the vector v. We denote by v (resp. v 1 and v ∞ ) the Euclidean norm (resp. 1 -norm and ∞ -norm) of v. For consistency with the implementation, we start indexing vectors from 0: the subscript of each entry of v ∈ R n is to be interpreted as an element of Z n = {0, · · · , n − 1}.
Let rot i (v) = (v −i , · · · , v −i+n−1 ) be a rotation of v ∈ R n . We denote by srot i (v) (for signed-rotation) the random variable generated by flipping the signs of all entries of rot i (v) independently at random with probability 1/2. We define the set
We use bold capital letters for matrices and denote by v i the i-th row of the matrix V, i.e. V = (v 0 , · · · , v n−1 ). We use V i,j to represent the entry in the i-th row and j-th column of V. Let I n be the n-dimensional identity matrix. We denote by ROT(v) (resp. SROT(v)) the matrix (rot 0 (v), · · · , rot n−1 (v)) (resp. (srot 0 (v), · · · , srot n−1 (v))). Note that all
For a distribution D, we write X ← D when the random variable X is sampled from D. Given a finite set S, let U (S) be the uniform distribution over S. We denote by E(X) the expectation of random variable X.
A (full-rank) n-dimensional lattice L is the set of all integer combinations of linearly independent vectors b 1 , · · · , b n ∈ R n , i.e.
We call B = (b 1 , · · · , b n ) a basis of L and write L = L(B). For a unimodular matrix U ∈ Z n×n , we have UB is also a basis of L(B), i.e. L(B) = L(UB). Let (b * 0 , · · · , b * n−1 ) be the Gram-Schmidt vectors of B. The volume of the lattice L(B) is vol(L(B)) = i b * i that is an invariant of the lattice. Given L ⊆ R n and t ∈ R n , the distance between t and L is dist(t, L) = min v∈L t − v .
Lattice reduction is an important tool for solving lattice problems and estimating the security of lattice-based cryptosystems. The goal of lattice reduction is to find a basis of high quality. The quality of a basis B is related to its root Hermite factor rhf (B) = b0 vol(L(B)) 1/n 1/n . Currently, the most practical lattice reduction algorithms are BKZ [32] and BKZ 2.0 [11] . We denote by BKZ-β the BKZ/BKZ 2.0 with blocksize β. In general, we assume the root Hermite factor of a BKZ-β basis is bounded by
when n β > 50.
The DRS Signature Scheme
In this section, we provide a brief description of the first DRS scheme. We may omit some details that are unnecessary for understanding our attack. For more details on the algorithms and implementations we refer to [29] .
To start with, we introduce several public parameters of DRS:
-n : the dimension -D : the diagonal coefficient of the secret key -b : the magnitude of the large coefficients (i.e. {±b}) in the secret key -N b : the number of large coefficients per vector in the secret key -N 1 : the number of small coefficients (i.e. {±1}) per vector in the secret key
Following the setting provided in [29] , the parameter D is chosen to be n and
The secret key of DRS is a matrix
It is easily verified that S is diagonal dominant. The public key is a matrix P such that L(P) = L(S) and the vectors in P are much longer than those in S.
Hash space. The specification submitted to the NIST [29] is rather unclear about the message space. Namely, only a bound of 2 28 is mentioned, which suggests a hash space M = (−2 28 , 2 28 ) n , following the original scheme [31] . Yet, we noted that the implementation seems to instead use the message space M = (0, 2 28 ) n :
the sign randomization is present, but commented out. Discussion with the designers 5 led us to consider this as an implementation bug, and we therefore focus on the analysis with M = (−2 28 , 2 28 ) n , following both the original scheme [31] and the intention of [29] . We strongly suspect that taking M = (0, 2 28 ) n would not be an effective countermeasure against the kind attack analyzed in this paper. Preliminaries experiments on this variant suggested that leak was stronger, but its relation to the secret key seemed more intricate.
For our experiments, we generated directly uniform points in that space rather than hashing messages to this space; according to the Random Oracle Model, this should make no difference.
Signature. The signature algorithm of DRS follows the one in [31] and its main component is a message reduction procedure in ∞ -norm. It is summarized below as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Message reduction in DRS signature algorithm
Input: a message m ∈ Z n , the secret matrix S Output: a reduced message w ∈ Z n such that w − m ∈ L(S)
if q = 0 then 5:
w ← w − qsi 6: k = 0 7: end if 8:
k ← k + 1, i ← (i + 1) mod n 9: until k = n 10: return w In brief, the message reduction is reducing successively each large coefficient m i of the message m by qD such that |m i − qD| < D but adding ±q, ±qb to m j with j = i according to the entries of M, until all coefficients of the reduced message are within (−D, D). Since S is diagonal dominant, the message can be reduced within bounded steps as proved in [29, 31] .
Besides the reduced message w, an auxiliary vector k is also included in the signature and used to accelerate the verification. To verify the signature, one would first check whether w ∞ < D and then check whether m − w = kP. In later discussions, we shall ignore the auxiliary vector, because it can be calculated in polynomial time from w, m and the public key P.
Intuition on a potential leak
Our approach is to try to recover S i,j by studying the distribution W i,j of (w i , w j ). Indeed, when a reduction happens at index i: w ← w − qs i , and when S i,j = 0 some correlation is introduced between w i and w j . Symmetrically, correlation is also introduced when S j,i = 0. Another source of correlations is created by other reductions at index k ∈ {i, j} when both S k,i and S k,j are non-zero; these events create much less correlations since the diagonal coefficients are much larger, but those correlations accumulate over many k's. One is tempted to model the accumulated correlations as those of some bi-variate Gaussians with a certain covariance.
Of course, there are complicated "cascading" phenomena: by modifying a coefficient, a reduction may trigger another reduction at an other index. But let us ignore such phenomena, and just assume that several reductions at indices k = i, j occur, followed by one reduction at index i with q = ±1, before the algorithm terminates. We depict our intuition as Figure 1 . In this simple model, we note that there are 4 degrees of liberty, 3 for the shape of the ellipsoid, and 1 for S i,j = −b, 0, b. 6 Therefore, one may expect to be able to recover all the parameters using 4 statistical measures. One natural choice is the following. First, measure the covariance matrix of the whole distribution, which gives 3 parameters. Assuming the clipped caps have small weights, this would roughly give the shape of the ellipsoid. For the last measure, one would select only sample for which |w i | is small, so as to focus on the superimposed displaced caps. With a bit of effort one would find an appropriate measurement.
Unfortunately, it seems rather hard to determine mathematically what will precisely happen in the full reduction algorithm, and to construct by hand a measurement on the distribution of (w i , w j ) directly giving S i,j , i.e. a function f such that f (W i,j ) = S i,j .
Training
While constructing such a function f by a mathematical analysis may be hard, our hope is that such function may be easy to learn using standard techniques, ranging from least-square method to convolutional neural networks. Indeed, going back to Figure 1 , recovering S i,j from W i,j can essentially be viewed as a grey-scale image classification problem (the lightness of the pixel (x, y) corresponding to the density of W i,j at (x, y)).
Features. We therefore proceed to design a few features, according to the intuition built above. The average of each w i is supposed to be 0, thus we do not treat it as a feature. Certainly, the covariance information is helpful, but we also introduce extra similar statistics to allow the learning algorithm to handle extra perturbations not captured by our simple intuition. We restrict our features to being symmetric: a sample (x, y) should have the same impact as (−x, −y). Indeed, while quite involved, the whole reduction process preserves this symmetry.
More specifically, by scaling a factor of D, consider the distribution W to have support (−1, 1) 2 . For a function f over (−1, 1) 2 , we write f (W ) = E (x,y)←W (f (x)). The features mentioned before are listed below 7 :
We could go on with higher degrees, but this would cause some trouble. First, higher degree moments converge much slower. Secondly, taking too many features would lead to over-fitting.
Then, following our intuition, we want to also consider features that focus on the central region. Still, we do not want to give too much weight to samples with x very close to 0. Indeed, there will be some extra perturbation after the reduction at index i, which could flip the sign of x. A natural function to take this into account is the following.
The most contributing sample will be the one for which x = ±1/ √ 3, and it is not clear that this is the optimal range to select. We therefore offer to the learning algorithm a few variants of the above that select samples with smaller values of x, hoping that it can find a good selection by combining all of them:
For any function f over R 2 , we call f t : (x, y) → f (y, x) the transpose of f . So far, we have introduced 13 different features, i.e. f 1 , · · · , f 7 and their transposes 9 We plot these functions in Figure 2 . Generating data. Then, we proceed to measure each W i,j for known values of S i,j , say, using 400 000 samples for each key S, and using 30 different keys S. This is implemented by our script gen training.py. This took about 38 core-hours.
Training. We naturally considered using advanced machine learning techniques (support vector regression [8] , random forest regression [23] and artificial neural networks) to construct a model, with the precious support of Han Zhao. Despite some effort, he was unable to find a method that outperforms what we achieved with a linear models f = 13 =1 x f trained using the least-square fit method. Yet his exploration was certainly far from exhaustive, and we do not conclude that least-square fit is the best method.
Evaluating and refining our model. After preliminary experiments, we noted that, depending on their position (i−j), some coefficients S i,j seem easier to learn than others. In this light, it is not clear that one should use the same function f for all indices i, j. Instead, we constructed two functions
x − f respectively for indices such that i − j mod n ≥ n/2 and i − j mod n < n/2. The model obtained by the least-square fit method is provided in Table 1 and plotted in Figure 3 . Moreover, the distributions of Remark 1. For other set of parameters, or even to refine our attack and recover more secret information, it is of course possible to cut our modeling in more than 2 pieces, but this requires more training data, and therefore more computational resources. Remark 2. As shown in Figures 4 and 5 , predicted values f (W i,j ) for large coefficients are usually of larger size than those for −1, 0, 1. Compared with large coefficients far from the main diagonal, those near the main diagonal tend to be predicted as a number of larger size. Furthermore, the variances of f (W i,j ) decrease with sample size growing, which provides a sanity check for our models.
Learning
Following the previous method, we obtain a matrix S consisting of all guesses of S i,j 's. 10 While clear correlations between the guess S and S were observed, the guess was not good enough by itself for the limited number of samples that we used. In the following, we exploit the "absolute-circulant" structure of the secret key to improve our guess. The experimental results described below are based on our script attack.py.
Determining the locations. Notice that all S i,j 's in a same diagonal are of the same absolute value, hence we used a simple trick to enhance the contrast between large and small coefficients. It consists in calculating
as the weight of the k-th diagonal. Since we used two different features for coefficients near/far from the main diagonal, for better comparison, the first n/2 − 1 weights were scaled by their maximum and so were the last n/2 weights. We denote by W − k the first n/2 − 1 scaled weights and by W + k the last n/2 ones. As illustrated in Figure 6 , the scaled weights of those diagonals consisting of large coefficients are significantly larger than others. A straightforward method to locate large coefficients is to pick the N b largest scaled weights. Verified by experimental results, we were able to perfectly locate all large coefficients, provided we collected sufficient signatures. For different sample size, i.e. the number of signatures, we respectively tested 20 instances and checked the accuracy of locations for large coefficients. All experimental data is illustrated in Table 2.  #signatures   13/16  14/16  15/16  16/16  50 000  5  3  6  6  100 000  ---20  200 000  ---20  400 000 ---20 Table 2 . Experimental measure of location accuracy. The column, labeled by K/16, shows the number of tested instances in which the largest N b scaled weights corresponded to exactly K large coefficient diagonals.
Determining the signs. We straightforward assumed the sign of measured feature f (W i,j ) is the same as that of S i,j , when S i,j = ±b. Unlike guessing locations, we could not recover all signs of large coefficients exactly, but as the sample size grows, we were still able to get a high accuracy, denoted by p. Then, we may expect to recover all signs of large coefficients in each row exactly with a probability p row = p N b (in our case N b = 16).
Moreover, we noticed that the accuracy of guessing signs for large coefficients in the lower triangle, i.e. S i,j with i > j, is higher than that for large coefficients in the upper triangle, thus we denote by p l and p u the accuracy corresponding to the lower and upper triangle. That may suggest us to guess the signs of large coefficients from the last row to the first row. Comparing guessing locations, guessing signs is much more sensitive to the number of signatures. That is because the sign information of S i,j only comes from f (W i,j ) rather than all features in the same diagonal so that it requires a more precise measurement. Furthermore, we tried a modified model for guessing signs: in training phase, we mapped S i,j to S i,j /b and then find x 's determining the global feature. Intuitively, the modified model further emphasizes large coefficients, but it performed almost the same as the current model in practice.
Exploiting Partial Secret Key Knowledge in Lattice Attacks
Using the technique described in last section, we are able to recover exactly all off-diagonal large coefficients in a row, with high probability (in addition to the diagonal coefficient D). First, we show how to adapt the BDD-uSVP attack, by exploiting the known coefficients of a row s k to decrease the distance of the BDD target to the lattice, making the problem easier. Then, we show a more involved version, where we also decrease the dimension of the lattice while maintaining its volume. While not much is gained to recover a first secret row s k , this technique makes guessing the rest of the key much faster.
In later discussion, assume that we have already successfully determined all −b, b and D coefficients in s k . Let M = {m 0 , · · · , m N b } be the set of all m's such that S k,m ∈ {−b, b, D} where m 0 < · · · < m N b . We still focus on the concrete parameter set (n, D, b, N b , N 1 ) = (912, 912, 28, 16, 432).
Direct BDD-uSVP attack
Let t ∈ Z n such that, if |S k,i | > 1, t i = S k,i , otherwise t i = 0, then dist(t, L) = √ N 1 . We construct a new lattice L with a basis
we have vol(L ) = vol(L) ≈ D n and L contains a vector of Euclidean norm √ N 1 + 1 D. Thus, to recover s k , it suffices to solve uSVP on L . New estimations of the blocksize required by BKZ to solve uSVP were given in [5] and have been confirmed by theoretical analysis and experiments in [3] . Following these results, we claim that s k could be recovered by BKZ-β when β satisfies:
We conclude that running BKZ-β with β = 146 should be sufficient to break the scheme. Typically [9, 1] , it is estimated that BKZ-β converges after about 16 tours, 11 therefore making 16(n + 1) calls to SVP-β:
Though the factor 16 may shrink by increasing the blocksize β progressively from 2 to β. Estimation of the cost of C SVP-β varies a bit in the literature, also depending on the algorithm used. The standard reference for estimating the cost enumeration is [11] , which gives a cost of 2 0.270β ln β−1.019β+16.10 [4, 10] clockcycles. Alternatively, the Gauss-Sieve algorithm [25] with dimension for free and other tricks showed a running time of 2 0.396β+8.4 clock cycles [12] .
Those two methods lead respectively to estimates of 2 78 and 2 80 clock-cycles to recover one secret row. One could of course repeat the attack over each row, but below, we present a strategy that slightly reduces the cost of guessing a first row, and greatly reduces the cost of guessing all the other rows.
Remark 3. These numbers are likely to be over-estimates. Indeed, while cost predictions have not been provided, the enumeration algorithms have been sped up in practice recently with the discrete-pruning technique [15, 6, 34] . More importantly, it has seen a significant progress on sieve [12, 2] and the General Sieve Kernel (G6K) [2] has pushed the SVP challenge record up to SVP-157. Unfortunately, the record timing on SVP challenges are difficult to use, as they only solve SVP up to an approximation factor of 1.05, which is significantly easier than the exact SVP typically used in BKZ. Moreover, the BKZ used in G6K proceeds in a different way; its behavior remains to be studied.
BDD-uSVP attack with dimension reduction
Next we detail how to also reduce the dimension of L but maintain its volume, when exploiting known coefficients of a BDD solution.
Let H = (h i,j ) i,j be the HNF (Hermite Normal Form) of P satisfying:
-h j,i = 0 for any j < i.
In general, |I| is very small (say ≤ 5), for example |I| = 1 if det(H) is square-free. Thus we have, with a high probability, that I ∩ M = ∅, i.e. h m,m = 1 for any m ∈ M . If not so, we choose another row s k of S.
, in which h i,j = h li,lj . Let a = (a 0 , · · · , a n−N b −2 ) where a i = m∈M S k,m h m,li . Let L be the lattice generated by
We Secondly, we can prove that L has an unusually short vector corresponding to all small coefficients of s k . Indeed, let c ∈ Z n such that cH = s k , then c m = S k,m for any m ∈ M thanks to h m,m = 1. Let c = (c l0 , · · · , c l n−2−N b ), then
Using the same argument as in the previous subsection, we could recover v , namely s k , by BKZ-β when β satisfies:
This condition is satisfied for β = 138. Based respectively on [11] and [12] , this gives attack in 2 73 and 2 77 clock-cycles. Again, these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt (see Remark 3).
Cheaply recovering all the other rows
Once a vector s k has been fully recovered, we have much more information on all the other secret rows. In particular, we know all the positions of the 0, and this allows to decrease the dimension from n to N b + N 1 + 1.
As in previous section we are able to construct a (N b +N 1 +1)-dimensional lattice L of the same volume as L and containing a vector of length √ N b · b 2 + N 1 + 1. Then, using BKZ-50 is enough 12 to recover the target vector and the cost is negligible compared to the cost of the first step.
Cryptanalysis of the DRS v2 Scheme
To resist the aforementioned attack, we did suggest in our conference version [36] some potential countermeasures summarized as follows:
1. Densely distributed coefficients. For a sparse yet wide set {0, ±1, ±b}, the gap between 1 and b allows one to detect large coefficients with much more confidence (see Figures 4) . Thus noise coefficients should better spread over an interval of integers {−u, · · · , u}. 2. No "absolute-circulant" structure. Indeed the "absolute-circulant" structure is exploited to significantly improve the guess (see Figure 6 ). Additionally, such structure seems unnecessary for the sake of small key size; indeed, the whole matrix, could be streamed by a PRG, only keeping the seed as the new secret key. 13 3. Perturbation/drowning. Depending on the situation, adding well-designed perturbation may [28] or may not [21, 14] be an effective countermeasure against statistical attacks. Drowning is a similar idea in spirit, but the added noise has a fixed distribution, typically much larger than what is to be hidden.
Along with above suggestions, we have also explicitly mentioned that countermeasures 1 and 2 may only mitigate the attack, but would not fully seal the leak.
Following up on our initial work, the DRS team proposed a new variant [30, 33] , called the DRS v2 scheme. Essentially, the modifications concern the key generation algorithm, and follow the principles of our countermeasures 1 and 2. Precisely, the modified secret key is still a diagonally dominant matrix S = D · I n − M but the noise matrix M is randomly chosen among all possible candidates:
We refer to [30] for detailed algorithms.
The DRS v2 scheme is assumed to withstand learning attack but without detailed security analysis. The impact of learning attack on it remains unclear. In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of our learning attack against DRS v2. In brief, we are not able anymore to recover partial secret coefficients exactly, but we are still able to recover key-related information that is helpful to lower the cost of lattice attacks. Qualitatively, we confirm that a leak is still here. Quantitatively, we estimate a drop by at least 30-bits of security having seen about 2 30 signatures, for the first set of parameters of DRS v2.
Leakage
We note that none of the changes introduced in DRS v2 affects the principle of the leak from Section 4.1, and therefore follow essentially the same basic steps. However, because the absolute-circulant structure has been removed, we can not apply our amplification trick anymore, and we therefore require much more data to detect biases. Furthermore, there is no distinct gap between the values to be guessed, contrary to the 'large' coefficients ±b of the first version of DRS.
It therefore becomes much less practical to carry out our experiments directly on cryptographically large instance. Instead, we proceed with experiments in small dimensions and extrapolate the behaviour.
Features. We just re-use all 13 features introduced in Section 4.2. Let us recall that the models are some linear combinations of these features trained using the least-square fit method.
Model training. We follow the previous idea of endowing each diagonal with a model. A minor difference is that we train two functions f d and f o for the main diagonal and others respectively. One may also split f o into more pieces as done before, but that does not improve the performance finally given the same training data. For each dimension n, we generate 5 random DRS v2 instances for training. And we separately train the model for each sample size N .
Computation. We let the computation run for about a week on 20 cores, for various parameters n ranging from 16 to 512. To reproduce the experiments, one just needs to execute the shell script full attack all.sh available at the public repository. 
where e i is the i-th row of I n . This is closely related to the complexity of the BDD-uSVP attack (see Section 5): the smaller r(n, N ) is, the lower the complexity is; and De i is the default target made without any secret information. Figure 7 shows the evolution of r(n, N ). It seems that given n, r(n, N ) decreasingly converges to some r ∞ (n) as N grows. This shows a limitation of our models: the model is incapable of computing the exact secret key no matter how many samples are provided. But on a positive note, r ∞ (n) behaves like a decreasing function of n, thus our model remains asymptotically effective (at the cost of more samples).
Despite some effort, we did not find a satisfactory fit for r(n, N ). We therefore only extrapolate an upper bound of r(n, N ) based on the apparent monotonicity in n of the derived function r (n, N ) = r(n, N · n 2 ) for all N . Indeed, Figure 8 suggests that r (n, N ) seems monotonically decreasing with n. Since r (192, 2 9.83 ) ≈ 0.367 is the minimum achieved by experiment, we use it as an estimate of r (n, 2 9.83 ) for n ≥ 192. Indeed our experiment can be pushed further; more training instances and larger sample sizes certainly refine the estimate. Yet this needs more computation resources and seems unlikely to improve the final security estimate significantly. Qualitatively, our results confirm that the DRS v2 scheme still suffers from a statistical leak.
Quantitative security analysis
In this subsection, we focus on the concrete parameter set (n, D) = (1108, 1108) claimed to provide at least 128-bits of security in [30] .
Security estimate without leaks. The original security estimate of DRS v2 [30, 33] considers the cost of the BDD-uSVP attack following the argument in [16] for which we use the shorthand the 2008 estimate. But as shown in [3] , 2008 estimate is now made obsolete by the 2016 estimate [5] that we follow in Section 5. For a fair comparison, let us first make a security estimate based on the 2016 estimate. As claimed in Section 5, some secret row vector, say s 0 could be recovered by BKZ-β when β satisfies:
We suppose s 0 − De 0 ≈ √ 2 · n−1 √ n , which is implicit in the original estimate [30, 33] . Then we verify that β = 220 satisfies the condition. This gives attack in 2 126 and 2 110 clock-cycles based on [11] and [12] respectively.
Refined security estimate with leaks. According to Section 6.1, given the model parametrized by (n, N ) along with N signatures, one can compute a guess S of the secret basis S such that s 0 − s 0 ≈ r(n, N ) · s 0 − De 0 . Then the required blocksize β for BKZ suffices to satisfies:
For a concrete comparison, we set N ≈ 2 9.83 · n 2 ≈ 2 30.1 , then r(n, N ) ≤ 0.367 as mentioned in Section 6.1. A routine computation yields that one may recover s 0 by BKZ-178 within 2 98 and 2 93 clock-cycles according to [11] and [12] . We highlight again that the security estimates are probably over-estimates: the cost of BKZ can be refined hopefully [2] and there may be some non-negligible difference between r(n, N ) and its upper bound 0.367. In addition, larger N would further reduce these numbers. Note that N ≈ 2 30 is far from the maximal query number 2 64 suggested in the NIST call for proposal [27, Sec 4.A.4 ].
Since we cannot determine some secret coefficients with high confidence, the "dimension reduction" technique (see Section 5.2) does not apply to DRS v2. Additionally, as the absolute-circulant structure is removed, we do not have as in Section 5.3 a much faster way of recovering the other secret vectors.
However, the cost of recovering all the rows should be significantly less than n times that of recovering a first secret row. Indeed, as we accumulate knowledge of many short vectors, the cost of the lattice attack should decrease significantly. Suppose we have recovered i secret vectors, say s 0 , · · · , s i−1 , we now proceed to recover s i . Let proj i (s) denote the projection of s on span(s 0 , · · · , s i−1 ) and orth i (s) = s − proj i (s). We consider the following lattice L with a basis
All s i 's are nearly orthogonal and s i ≈ D, hence vol(L ) ≈ D n−i . A standard heuristic suggests that orth i (s i − s i ) ≈ n+1−i n+1 s i − s i . Consequently, given s 0 , · · · , s i−1 , one can recover s i by BKZ-β with β satisfying: the first calls of BKZ. Note that we simply set β = 50 when its prediction is less than 50, which only results in a negligible impact on the security estimate. By some numerical computation, the overall cost is around 2 101 and 2 97 clockcycles based on [11] and [12] respectively, that is, only about 2 4 times the cost of recovering a single vector, and not n ≈ 2 10 times as the naive approach would.
Conclusion
We have shown that the DRS scheme is in principle susceptible to a statistical attack: signatures do leak information about the secret key. More concretely, for the first set of parameters submitted to the NIST [29] , we have shown its security should be considered below 80-bits after 100 000 ≈ 2 17 signatures have been released, contradicting the original claim of 128-bits of security. While such a large number of signatures may not be released in many applications, it remains much lower than the bound of 2 64 signatures given by the NIST call for proposal [27, Sec 4.A.4] . We also verify that despite the countermeasure, signature transcripts of the DRS v2 scheme [30, 33] still leak some exploitable information on the secret key. After 2 30 signatures have been released, the security provided by the first suggested parameter set should be considered below 100-bits rather than the original claim of 128-bits.
In addition, we would like to clarify that our security estimates are likely to be over-estimates. It seems possible to improve the learning step by using more signatures, better-chosen features and advanced machine learning techniques. Working with larger instances will also help to evaluate the model performance more accurately. As for the cost of lattice attacks, we did stick to the best known attack methodology in this paper. But we do not take account of the state-ofthe-art algorithms, e.g. discrete pruning technique for enumeration [15, 6, 34] and the General Sieve Kernel for sieve [2] , that have unfortunately not yet been the object of easily usable predictions. Overall, it is not clear how much effort an accurate cryptanalysis of DRS deserves. In our view, our current attack suffices to demonstrate the need to fix the leak of all current DRS schemes [29, 30, 33] , and maybe to re-parametrize them.
Potential countermeasure
We note nevertheless that this statistical attack seems much less powerful than the statistical attacks presented in [26, 14] against the original schemes GGH [18] and NTRUSign [21] . Indeed, our attack requires much more signatures, and still only recovers partial secret key information. In this light, we do not conclude that the approach of [31, 29, 30, 33] is to be discarded at once, at least if it shows competitive performances.
As we saw (Section 6), the mitigation countermeasures did make the attack less powerful, but did not seal the leak, and we predict a noticeable decrease of security from this leak. Given this track record of non-provable countermeasure to leaks in lattice based signature schemes, we find the formal approaches preferable. Perturbation and drowning could be promising. We note that the problem of directly trying to forge a signature seems harder than recovering the secret key with the current parameters of DRS. This means that allowing larger vectors for signatures (up to a certain cross-over point) should not affect security. This gives a lot of room for perturbation or drowning, for which ad-hoc concrete statistical statements could plausibly be made, maybe exploiting Rényi divergence as in [5, 7] .
Finally we insist that a much more thorough analysis of the statistical properties of the scheme should be provided to sustain its security. A statistical argument would be much more reassuring than the experimental failure of the type of attack described in this paper.
